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. Sobre los tribunales episcopales, see Lamoreaux, 1995, 143-167; Maymó Capdevila, 1997, I, 165-70; Cuena Boy, 2016, 120-134. 6 According to O. Seeck (1919, 11) , the formula data epistula o data epistula ppo, as it appears in this and in other cases (CTh 16.2.15, 4.13.5, 8.1.8, 8.4.6) at the end of a legal document, indicates that the date does not correspond to that of the original text of the legislator, but rather to the letter whereby the Praetorian Prefect officially transmitted the imperial constitution.
The same Augustuses to their dear friend Severus, Greetings.
By a law of Our Clemency We prohibit bishops to be accused in the courts, lest there should be an unrestrained opportunity for fanatical spirits to accuse them, while the accusers assume that they will obtain impunity by the kindness of the bishops. Therefore, if any person should lodge any complaint, such complaint must unquestionably be examined before other bishops, in order that an opportune and suitable hearing may be arranged for the investigation of all concerned.
Given as a letter on the ninth day before the kalends of October.-September 23. Received on the nones of October in the year of the consulship of 355. INTERPRETATION: It is specifically prohibited that any person should dare to accuse a bishop before secular judges, but he shall not delay to submit to the hearing of bishops whatever he supposes may be due him according to the nature of the case, so that the assertions which he makes against the bishop may be decided in a court of other bishops. 7
This law prohibited pressing charges against bishops (arguendos eos) before secular courts (in iudiciis), establishing the appropriate see (opportuna adque commoda audientia) of an Episcopal tribunal for this purpose (apud alios episcopos). 8 In other words, with the personal recognition of the privilegium fori for bishops, 9 lawmakers attempted to avoid the intervention of secular courts in disputes (querellae) that should 7 CTh 16.2.12 (ed. Th. Mommsen, : IDEM AA. SEVERO SVO SLVTEM. Mansuetudinis nostrae lege prohibemus in iudiciis episcopos accusari, ne, dum adfutura ipsorum beneficio inpunitas aestimatur, libera sit ad arguendos eos animis furialibus copia. Si quid est igitur querellarum, quod quispiam defert, apud alios potissimum episcopos convenit explorari, ut opportuna adque commoda cunctorum quaestionibus audientia commodetur. DATA EPISTVLA VIIII KAL. OCTOB., ACC. NON., OCTOB. ARBITIONE ET LOLLIANO CONSS. INTERPRETATIO: Specialiter prohibetur, ne quis audeat apud iudices publicus episcopum accusare, sed in episcoporum audientiam perferre non differat, quidquit sibi proqualitate negotii putat posse competere, ut in episcoporum aliorum iudicio, quae adserit contra episcopum, debeant definiri. English translation by Pharr, 1952, 442. 8 As would happen with the remainder of the legislation of Constantius II, it is possible that this law would be repealed by emperor Justinian (Génestal, 1908, 165, 168-69) . Nevertheless, Valentinian I would eventually ban bishops condemned by their peers from appealing to secular justice (CTh 16.36.20, year 369) Delmaire and Richard, 2005, 61. 9 According to B. Biondi (1952, 378) , this privilege had no restrictions on the matter of application. See. Falchi, 1991, 22, 83; Lizzi Testa, 2004, 177; Delmaire, Rougé and Richard, 2005, 102; Banfi, 2005, 102-103; Pergami, 2011. Sirm. 3 , 1985, 193; Falchi, 1991, 83; Banfi, 2005, 153-60, 167-76, 213-23, 233-41. be solved exclusively in an episcopal court. It is very likely that said jurisdiction not only covered purely religious matters, but also those related to the sphere of criminal law. 10
The ratio legis is expressed in the legislative text itself: to avoid providing fanatics with opportunities to easily accuse bishops (ne... libera sit ad arguendos eos animis furialibus copia) outside of canon law, which was far more lenient and with a tendency towards pardons (mansuetudinis nostra lege… animis furialibus copia) and which therefore had a tendency to maintain the impunity of the accused parties (dum adfutura ipsorum beneficio impunitas aestimatur). 11
It is obvious that this legal ruling by Constantius II was meant as an attempt to prevent civil courts from being exploited by members of the Church as a tool to strike at their rivals. 12 Considering that religious controversies had become a severe threat to the unity of the Empire, the emperor considered repressing them from their very roots a priority. 13
Following in the footsteps of his father, albeit with the same lack of success, Constantius sought to promote a process of effective pacification between Athanasians and Philo- According to the majority of scholars, the use of the word accusari implies that the Episcopal jurisdiction also extended to the field of criminal law. On this subject, see Gaudemet, 1958, 241; Falchi, 1986, 179-212; Banfi, 2005, 101 . Nevertheless, as G. L. Falchi pointed out, severe criminal cases were excluded from the privilegium fori (2000, 151 and 2008, 149) . In fact, later on, in CTh 16.2.23 (year 376), the privilegium fori would be reduced in criminal matters to slight offenses related to the observancy of religion (Blanco Cordero, 1944, 79-80; Cuena Boy, 1985, 73) . Cfr. Mommsen, 1899, 290; Robinson, 1995, 12. It is true that, in the Visigothic interpretatio (Breviarium, 16.1.2), the constitution of Constantius II appears to be restricted to negotia, that is, to matters exclusively related to the field of the Church, but said interpretation may have been adapted to the context of Alaric, deviating from the original spirit of the law (see Banfi, 2005, 102) . On the different opinions reflected in doctrine on this subject, see Cimma, 1989, 101-12. 11 Boyd, 1905, 92-3; Génestal, 1908, 164-65; Biondi, 1952, 377-78; Gaudemet, 1958, 256; Falchi, 1991, 23-4; Gemmiti, 1991, 22; Ombretta Cuneo, 1997, 277; De Giovanni, 2000 5 , 45-6; Magnou-Nortier, 2002, 118-19, n. 40; Delmaire, Rougé and Richard, 2005, 61; Banfi, 2005 , 102-05. 12 Blanco Cordero, 1944 Banfi, 2005, 80, 96 . This practice is particularly recurrent in the latter years of Constantine, a time during which a tendency to make use of civil courts of law to resolve disputes of a religious nature began to emerge. A clear example of this practice can be found in the Synod of Tyre (CE 335), which was summoned to judge Athanasius of Alexandria (Athan. ). See Girardet, 1975, 68; Twomey, 1982, 250; Arnold, 1991, 143, 149; Hess, 2002, 98. 13 See Mozzillo, 1954, 109. controversy that would extend painfully through time and which affected vast swathes of the Church.
It is true that the recognition of the privilegium fori for bishops and the banning of the requirement to appear before a secular court in detriment to an episcopal instance were inspired by a number of canons that had been approved, to the same end, by Church councils. 15 Scarcely a year later, a council gathered at Sardica (modern Sofia: a city located at the border between both parts of the empire that were, respectively, subject to the two emperors) insisted once again on the jurisdictional independence of bishops. However, in this case, and under special circumstances, the postulates of the Western Church in favor of ultimate authority belonging to the bishop of Rome prevailed:
Bishop Hosius said: if any bishop were to be denounced and stripped of his dignity by his peers gathered in a synod, and he wished to appeal to the Most Holy Father of the Church of Rome, he should write to the bishops of the neighboring province if he wishes to be heard and to have the investigation on his cause be re-opened, so that they may research every 15 Falchi, 1991, 24; Magnou-Nortier, 2002, 118-19, n. 40. 16 6: 208] ) which puts a clear reprimand on the subject in the words of Ossius. Furthermore, we may also observe an ideological development that runs parallel to the process of promotion of the privilegium fori, based on the most relevant biblical passages on the separation of powers. As the will of Constantius to control the Church through Synods intensified, so did the opposition of the Nicene bishops. See Kartaschow, 1976, 160-61; Barnes, 1993, 168-69; Roldanus, 2006, 106-108. 19 In the words of A. Banfi (2005, 86) , "l'imperatore si trovava coinvolto nelle dispute fra ecclesiastici anche suo malgrado, a causa della condotta degli ecclesiastici stessi, i quali ricorrevano all'autorità imperiale nella speranza di rafforzare le proprie posizioni a discapito dei loro avversari". 20 Biondi, 1952, 378; Gaudemet, 1958, 241; De Giovanni, 2000, 46; Banfi, 2005, 83-84; Parvis, 2006, 210. 24 The accentuation of this tendency is obvious since the Council held in Rome at the behest of the bishop , 1992, 147-154; Meyendorff, 1996, 7-27; Chadwick, 2003, 16. 25 As can be seen from the comments of Athanasius on the trial (Athan. Girardet, 1973, 72; Brennecke, 1984, 184-192; Gottlieb, 1976, 44-6. 27 Soz. HE 4.9.1-5 (ed. Bidez-Hansen, GCS); Theod. HE 2.15 (ed. Parmentier, GCS). All those who refused to subscribe to the condemnation of Athanasius were deposed from their sees and condemned to exile. This fact led to a profound reaction from the foremost polemists of the period, Hilary of Poitiers and Lucifer of Cagliari, who used the repressive measures adopted by the emperor to denounce the violence carried out against Nicene bishops for their in the imperial palace, and were forced to subscribe to a document condemning Athanasius which had been previously prepared by the emperor himself. 28 Faced with such pressures, broad swathes of the Western Church stood firmly in their assertion of the exclusivity of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on matters of Episcopal authority. 29 It is possible that, as some scholars have pointed out, the constitution whereby the forum ecclesiasticum was acknowledged was actually a sort of compensatory response to those bishops who had been forced to subscribe to the decisions approved in the Council of Milan. Those bishops also shared the same spirit that had compelled Hilary of Poitiers to express his most energetic protests against the policy the emperor had hitherto maintained in matters concerning ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 30 Gustafson, 1994, 422 and Idem, 1997, 82 , for other degrading practices such as tattooing, whose goal was making the sentence publicly visible). See Fournier, 2006, 157-166. 28 The threats and intimidations against the bishops were largely responsible for the success of the imperial plans against the patriarch of Alexandria: see the account of Hilary Banfi, 2005, 94 . It is nevertheless surprising to note the fact that appealing to the authority of the bishop of Rome to resolve conflicts in the purely ecclesiastic sphere experienced a significant increase during the most acute period of the Arian polemic. It is possible that the very legal enunciation of the priuilegium fori was, in some way, a strategy meant to put a stop to the growing influence and importance of the bishop of Rome who, according to the account of Soc. HE 2.15, was empowered to resolve such cases through the exercise of a "special privilege". See Hess, 2002, 190-200 , which provides an in-depth studies of the canons of appeal; Dupuy, 1987, 363-7; Hefele, 1896, vol. 2, 108-58 (Hefele and H. Leclercq, 1907, vol. 1, 2, 759-804) . The right of the bishop of Rome to review passed sentences is specified in canons 3 and 4 of Sardica: Hefele, 1896, vol. 2, 112-3 and 116 (Hefele and H. Leclercq, 1907, vol. 1, 2, 762-63 and 766-67) . 30 See Boyd, 1905, p. 92; Biondi, 1952, 378; Gaudemet, 1958, 256; Gemmiti, 1991, 23; De Giovanni, 2000, 46; Banfi, 2005, 96 . Athanasius of Alexandria himself, in exile after having fled from the executors of the sentence passed against him in the Council of Milan, clearly expresses the need for the existence of two separate jurisdictions, the civil and the ecclesiastic jurisdictions, as well as the central role of the bishop of Rome in the latter (Twomey, 1982, 428) . 31 The trial against Hilary of Poitiers seems to emerge from different causes than the one carried out in Milan, Brennecke, 1984, 135-36, 167 and 229; Williams, 1991, 202-217; Barnes, 1992, 129-140; Burns, 1994, 273-289; Beckwith, 2005, 221-238; Alba López, 2008, 277-301. Opelt, 1973, 203-217; Rosen, 1988, 67; Humphries, 1998, 219-220 . On the historiographical debate on the historical context of these works, see also Smulders, 1995, 1-28; Alba López, 2013, 34-81. 33 Génestal, 1908, 163-64, n. 2; Gemmiti, 1991, 23 . 36 Banfi, 2005, 95-6. sponsored Church in exchange for a number of privileges. 37 Not only did Constantius II display remarkable balance in his favorable treatment of the Church and clergy in what concerns the general interests of the Empire -as, according to P. Ombretta Cuneo, in those cases in which these interests were under threat, he could display more generosity by granting bishops immunity in the criminal see-, 38 he also strove to favor the Church faction that was closest to his personal beliefs.
Keeping in mind the problems caused by the Donatist schism, and, especially, the Arian controversy, Constantius II intended to use this law to prevent dissident or minority groups from recurring to civil jurisdiction. Such groups were aware of their weakness and therefore attempted to avoid the ecclesiastical tribunals that were controlled by the dominant currents within the Church. In fact, the emperor was well aware of the fact that the 'Arian' doctrine he espoused had achieved a position of absolute pre-eminence within the Church (at least in the West) and that supporters of Athanasius would be unable to disturb the authority granted to the episcopal tribunals, which were beyond appeal. 39
Furthermore, by acknowledging exclusive ecclesiastic competence in relation to bishops, the emperor attempted to avoid the noxious and dangerous conflict of competences with civil courts of law, a chronic problem since the earliest periods of the reign of
Constantine. 40
Indeed, either as a cause or a consequence of the highly tense climate between the different actors involved in the Arian-Nicene conflict, the need to provide legal channels to the much-desired ecclesiastic jurisdiction must also be taken into account. This is particularly relevant in the light of the insistent demands for a separation of competences, which had mostly been formulated by the pro-Nicene side. Thus, it is not surprising to find an eminently political discourse on the concepts of authority and power among the direct protagonists of the conflict. Athanasius of Alexandria and Hilary of Poitiers, among 37 In the words of A. di Berardino, "era importante la distinzione tra un vescovo ortodosso, scismatico oppure eretico per l'applicazione delle leggi da parte delle autorità e del conseguente godimento dei privilegi" (1998, 47) . 38 Ombretta Cuneo,1997, CX.
39 Gaudemet, 1958, 241; Banfi, 2005, 100 . 40 Banfi, 2005, 99 . Thus, in the context of the Donatist schism, Miltiades, the bishop of Rome, refused to act as an imperial court, ashe had been ordered to by the emperor, and he gathered a traditional Roman synod to pass his sentence. Faced with the rejection of their theses, the Donatists appealed to Constantine once more, to which he responded by summoning another synod in Arles. The bishop of Rome refused to attend it and sent two legates, inaugurating a practice that has endured to this day for similar situations, even though the bishop of Rome ultimately maintains the ultimate decision, see Barnes, 1975, 20-21; Girardet, 1975, 6-26; Idem, 1989, 185-206; Idem, 2010, 141; Frend, and Clancy, 1977, 104-109; Lancel, 1979, 217-229. others, were the ones to formulate most clearly the prevailing discourse of their peers on the need for a separation of the Church and the State. They also stressed the need for the former to exert a tutelary function over the latter, a nuance that would be definitively theological and political legacy insofar as he advocates the existence of a legal space between God and the sovereign to act as a reference for the correct use of power. See Nautin, 1974, 238-243; Williams, 1995, 520-23; Williams, 2002, 233-34; Antognazzi, 2004, 282-83; Alba López, 2011, 343-49. 42 Klauser, 1952 2 ; Chrysos, 1969, 119-129; Jerg, 1970; Dupont, 1972, 742-48; Di Berardino, 1998, 35-38; Lizzi Testa, 1998, 81-104; Rapp, 2005, 236-38; Siniscalco, 2007 6 , 181-88. 44 Pilara, 2004, 355. 45 After having publicly denounced Auxentius, Hilary was submitted to the trial of ten bishops: Hil. Meslin, 1967, 42-3; McLynn, 1994, 25-6; Williams, 2002, 71 . In spite of this, according to Hilary, maintaining Auxentius in his see was due to the fact that he hid his true doctrinal alignment before the court in charge of settling the question (Hil. Aux. 7 and 13-15 [PL 10: 613 C-614 A and 617 A-618 C]). On the other hand, we know that, after the ruling of the synod of Beziers, Julian reviewed the case and stated that he did not found any evidence of guilt in Hilary, but there is no evidence that this ruling had anything to do with the development of the trial, Hil. Lib. II ad Const. 2 (CSEL 65: 198) : nec leuem habeo querellae meae testem dominum meum religiosum Caesarem tuum Iulianum, qui plus in exilio meo contumeliae a malis, quam ego iniuriae, pertulit. 47 The bishop of Poitiers merely stated that he was forced to leave Milan by royal mandate (Aux. 9: iubeor de Mediolano proficisci, cum consistendi mihi in ea inuito rege nulla esset libertas [PL 10: 615 A-B]) and that an unfair image of Eusebius of Vercelli and himself as the promoters of the dispute was being spread (Idem, 15 [PL 10: 618 C]).
for with this legislation, the vigilant oversight of the emperor did not cease completely;
rather, it inconspicuously receded into the background.
All in all, we may venture to state that the turbulent repression of Athanasius of Alexandria and those who supported his cause or simply voiced their public support to the Nicene Creed during the period of solitary reign of Constantius II (350-361) required legal arguments to support said repressive measures. This led to a progressive renunciation of violence by political power to sustain itself. As in the latter years of his rule, Constantine heavy-handedly used synods as a means to remove the stubborn opposition of his adversaries and they were also used to purge the ranks of the bishops during the reign of Constantius II. Nevertheless, in order to silence critical voices that demanded full jurisdictional independence for the Church, the emperor voluntarily renounced taking part, either actively or through his delegates, in the Council meetings, legally guaranteeing their independence. However, this did not imply that the emperor would renounce this useful tool, as his will was executed through those bishops who, by holding doctrinal positions opposed to those of their adversaries, had proven to be effective collaborators with civil power and its interests. Thus, even though Constantius apparently lost his sway over the Church through the promotion of the privilegium fori, he actually managed to exert a de facto stronger pressure through his collaborators than that which he could have achieved prior to passing this law. -. 2013. Autoridad y poder en los escritos polémicos de Hilario de Poitiers.
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